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Igor Krtolica
Can Something Take Place?
Abstract   First, starting from a text Deleuze and Guattari wrote in 1984 on the 
aftermath of May 1968 in France (“May 68 Did Not Take Place”), this article tries 
to analyze in what way this diagnosis – made in the middle of the 1980s, when 
what is now commonly called neo-liberalism was unfolding both in America and 
in Europe – can apply to our current political situation. Secondly, this analysis 
shows that maybe the very conditions of social critique and social engagement 
are endangered today more than yesterday, because of the new patterns of 
social restraint embodied by the evolution of communication (especially television). 
Thirdly, the author asks the question: therefore, under which conditions social 
critique and engagement are now possible?
Keywords: engagement, Deleuze, Guattari, May 68, event, critic, television, 
communication
The debate on social engagement would not come up if we were conclu-
sively guarded against the ongoing risk of disengagement. Neither would 
the debate come up today if that risk did not relate to new patterns of social 
restraint which are driving us to invent the forms of engagement that are 
suited and tailored to the new situation.
In 1984, in the middle of those wintry years when, both in America and in 
Europe, what is now commonly called neo-liberalism was unfolding, Deleuze 
and Guattari wrote a text on the events of May 1968 in France, sixteen 
years after these same events. In this document entitled “May 68 Did Not 
Take place”, they stated five points. 1°) First, they argued that an event is 
defined as an opening of possibilities and what unlocks in there will remain 
unraveled. Although set in the past, an event shall never be gone past. “In 
historical phenomena such as the revolution of 1789, the Commune, the 
revolution of 1917, there is always one part of the event that is irreducible 
to any social determinism, or to causal chains. Historians are not very fond 
of this aspect: they restore causality after the fact. Yet the event is itself a 
splitting off from, or a breaking with causality; it is a bifurcation, a deviation 
with respect to laws, an unstable condition which opens up a new field of 
the possible. […] In this sense, an event can be turned around, repressed, 
hijacked, betrayed, but there still is something there that cannot be outdated. 
Only renegades would say: it’s outdated. But even if the event is ancient, it 
can never be outdated: it is an opening onto the possible. It passes as much 
into the interior of individuals as into the depths of a society” (Deleuze 
2003: 215). In Deleuze and Guattari’s view, the events of May 1968 in 
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France were of the same kind inasmuch as they opened new possibilities, 
“new relations with the body, with time, sexuality, the immediate surround-
ings, with culture, work…” (Deleuze 2003: 216). 2°) Secondly, Deleuze 
and Guattari yet argued that although the event cannot be gone past as 
such, it needs realization, it requires some forms of institutional embodi-
ments that can actually fulfil the possibilities it opened. Well, now “May 
68 Did Not Take Place” (Mai 68 n’a pas eu lieu) means precisely that French 
society failed to materialize the events of May 1968 into such institutions: 
“The American New Deal and the Japanese boom corresponded to two very 
different examples of subjective redeployment, with all sorts of ambiguities 
and even reactionary structures, but also with enough initiative and creativ-
ity to provide a new social state capable of responding to the demands of 
the event. Following ’68 in France, on the contrary, the authorities did not 
stop living with the idea that ‘things will settle down’. And indeed, things 
did settle down, but under catastrophic conditions. May ’68 was not the 
result of a crisis, nor was it a reaction to a crisis. It is rather the opposite. It 
is the current crisis, the impasses of the current crisis in France that stem 
directly from the inability of French society to assimilate May ’68. French 
society has shown a radical incapacity to create a subjective redeployment 
on the collective level, which is what ’68 demands; in light of this, how could 
it now trigger an economic redeployment that would satisfy the expectations 
of the ‘Left’? French society never came up with anything for the people: 
not at school nor at work. Everything that was new has been marginalized 
or turned into a caricature. […] Each time the possible was closed off” 
(Deleuze 2003: 216). 3°) Thirdly, from then on Deleuze and Guattari could 
suggest that the ‘children of May 68’ found themselves caught up in a con-
tradictory situation. For if the event of May 1968 did continue to run through 
them, to labor them and sometimes heat them up, nothing in their social 
reality could meet this subjective disposition; and since nothing but silence 
would echo their subjectivity, they developed the feeling that what was go-
ing on did not really apply or relate to them, they started showing strange 
unconcerned interest to what was happening to them. “They are strangely 
indifferent, and yet very well-informed. They have stopped being demand-
ing or narcissistic, but they know perfectly well that there is nothing today 
that corresponds to their subjectivity, to their potential of energy. They even 
know reforms are rather directed against them. They are determined to 
mind their own business as much as they can. They keep it open, hang on 
to something possible” (Deleuze 2003: 217). 4°) Fourthly, Deleuze and 
Guattari argued that their reading of French society in the mid-eighties could 
apply to the rest of the world, given the events of 1968 were worldwide1. 
1  Deleuze will remind it in a long comment of his book on Foucault : “To read some 
analyses, you would think that 1968 took place in the heads of a few Parisian intel-
lectuals. We must therefore remember that it is the product of a long chain of world 
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“This is true of the entire world. What we institutionalize in unemployment, 
in retirement, or in school, are controlled ‘situations of abandonment’, for 
which the handicapped are the model. The only subjective redeployment 
actually occurring on a collective level are those of an unbridled American-
style capitalism, or even a Muslim fundamentalism like in Iran, or of Afro-
American religions like in Brazil: they are reversed figures of a new ortho-
doxy (one should add here European neo-Papism). Europe has nothing to 
suggest, and France seem to no longer have any other ambition than to 
assume the leadership of an Americanized and over-armed Europe that 
would impose from above the necessary economic redeployment” (Deleuze 
2003: 217). 5°) But this reading was not a pessimistic one since Deleuze 
and Guattari were making a point that, fifthly, there survived a field of 
possibilities that is likely to be realized. “Yet the field of the possible lies 
elsewhere: along the East-West axis, in pacifism, insofar as it intends to 
break up relations of conflict, or over-armament, but also of complicity and 
distribution between the United States and the Soviet Union. Along the 
North-South axis, in a new internationalism that no longer relies solely on 
an alliance with the Third-World, but on the phenomena of third-worldifi-
cation in the rich countries themselves (for example, the evolution of 
metropolises, the decline of the inner-cities, the rise of a European third-
world, such as Paul Virilio has theorized them)” (Deleuze 2003: 217).
A year later, in 1985, in The Time-Image, the second volume of his study 
on cinema, Deleuze would raise this diagnosis on his time to the rank of 
‘modern fact’. “The modern fact is that we no longer believe in this world. 
We do not even believe in the events which happen to us, love, death, as 
if they only half concerned us. It is not we who make cinema; it is the world 
which looks to us like a bad film. […] The link between man and world is 
broken” (Deleuze 1985: 223). Yet, the following year, in 1986, in an intro-
duction to the book Ciné-Journal by film critic Serge Daney (“Letter to Serge 
events, and of a series of currents of international thought, that already linked the 
emergence of new forms of struggle to the production of a new subjectivity, if only in its 
critique of centralism and its qualitative claims concerning the ‘quality of life’. On the 
level of world events we can briefly quote the experiment with self-management in 
Yugoslavia, the Czech Spring and its subsequent repression, the Vietnam War, the Al-
gerian War and the question of networks, but we can also point to the signs of a ‘new 
class’ (the new working class), the emergence of farmers’ or students’ unions, the so-
called institutional psychiatric and educational centers, and so on. On the level of 
currents of thought we must no doubt go back to Lukacs, whose History and Class 
Consciousness was already raising questions to do with a new subjectivity; then the 
Frankfurt School, Italian Marxism and the first signs of ‘autonomy’ (Tronti); the reflection 
that revolved around Sartre on the question of the new working class (Gorz); the groups 
such as ‘Socialism or Barbarism’, ‘Situationism’, ‘the Communist Way’ (especially Felix 
Guattari and the ‘micropolitics of desire’). Certain currents and events have continued 
to make their influence felt.” (Deleuze 1986: 123).
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Daney: Optimism, Pessimism and Travel”), we would find out that the loss 
of the world was also the definition of television: “the world is lost, the 
world itself ‘turns to film’, any film at all, and this is what television amounts 
to, the world turning to any film at all, and, as you say here, ‘nothing hap-
pening to human beings any more, but everything happening only to images’” 
– “that’s just what television amounts to, the whole world turning to film” 
(Deleuze 1990: 107–110). Of course, it is not insignificant that this diagnosis 
on the current situation was indeed formulated in texts engaging both 
political philosophy and aesthetics, dealing with the two major mass media 
in the twentieth century, namely cinema and television. Our not believing 
in this world is definitely a subjective disposition, our current subjective 
disposition. Yet, this subjective disposition proceeds from a new form of 
social restraint, from new forms of power which have a direct effect on the 
way we perceive and feel, which shape “postures, attitudes, perceptions, 
expectations” (Deleuze and Guattari 1980: 262). Well, now audio-visual 
mass media are those that primarily work this way to fashion and chisel 
individuals that are adapted to the social standards. And it is down to 
television to play the part of this inner relationship between, on the one 
hand, the proliferation of clichés in which our world becomes a bad film, and 
on the other hand the function of social engineering, both being closely 
linked together so that people’s reactions and responses are pre-tuned to 
the social demands. This is incidentally Deleuze’s second definition of 
television: “television is the form in which the new powers of ‘control’ 
become immediate and direct” (Deleuze 1990: 107).
At the end of the 1980s Deleuze will call this new form of power ‘commu-
nication’. What defines communication is the tranmission of information 
in which information designates a series of order-words. Thus, every time 
we are informed “we are not ask to believe but to behave as if we did” 
(Deleuze 2003: 298–299), as in “police or government announcements, 
which often have little plausibility or truthfulness, but say very clearly what 
should be observed and retained” (Deleuze and Guattari 1980: 96). That 
is, in other words, the gap has turned into depths: Not only we’ve stopped 
believing in this world but we are not even requested to believe in it, only 
to pretend, which is to say behave accordingly to what we are told. The 
short history of television fully proves this diagnosis right. The truth is 
television has always been the field of transmission for public opinion, the 
place where social consensus circulates. However, the conversion in the 
early 1980s from a national public television to a privately owned com-
mercial television marked a passage of this media now devoted to the social 
construction of brains that are fitted to the demands of the market. This 
becomes even more self-evident when looking at the recent history of real-
ity TV which, at the beginning involved, in the artificial conditions of a 
recording studio, producing a laboratory-reality that would be useful for 
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the voyeuristic observation of average individuals through the conducts 
and manners of whom we were notified to identify with. But reality TV 
quickly turned into an open-air personal coaching operation meant to 
specifically choose the candidates who would be most in keeping with the 
requirements of individual performance as dictated by the labor market, 
while in the meantime weeding out the other applicants. The study of social 
consensus (in which television is yet again a privileged means of commu-
nication) cannot disregard a study of capitalism. It is the production, the 
distribution and the consumption of conformist attitudes that are suited to 
the market’s demands, it is the fostering of the company-form down to the 
scale of the individual, what Michel Foucault discussed in 1979 in his lec-
tures on The Birth of Biopolitics. The famous selection of the rivals which 
has instituted the typical traits of democracy since Athens now only con-
forms to the cost-effectiveness standards – but it is introduced in the guise 
of self-fulfilment.
The well-renowned study of work psychology Alain Ehrenberg published 
in 1998, The Weariness of the Self (La fatigue d’être soi), shows how this 
new form of power produces some subjectivity’s new illnesses in return, 
the pathologies of depression. Ehrenberg writes that “depression starts 
succeeding as soon as the disciplinary design of conducts, the rules of 
authority and compliance with standards to what is forbidden which used 
to designate a prospect to classes and both sexes, depression rules when 
these designs have given way to the norms that encourage each and 
every one to personal initiative demanding one should fulfil themselves. 
[Depression] takes the form of an obsession with liability in which the 
prevailing feeling is that of inadequacy or inefficiency. The depressed 
person does not measure up, he is tired of having to become himself” 
(Ehrenberg 1998: 10-11). When this helplessness haunts him, when he 
suddenly feels his future has been taken away from him and when he finds 
out he has been displaced into the past, the depressed individual has be-
come a has-been, an outmoded individual of no significance. Therefore, 
“depression is a pathology of our time (the depressed individual has no 
future) and a pathology of motivation (the depressed individual lacks 
energy and is stuck in a slump)” (Ehrenberg 1998: 294). This is similar to 
what Deleuze had diagnosed in the early 1990s when, in a short publica-
tion on Beckett, The Exhausted, he named ‘fatigue’ this new subjective 
disposition (“The tired hasn’t got any more (subjective) possibility: he 
therefore cannot realize the smallest (objective) possibility” (Deleuze 1992: 
57), but also, conversely, when reporting on control societies he warned 
against the general request to constantly remain motivated (“Many young 
people have a strange craving to be ‘motivated’, they’re always asking for 
special courses and continuing education; it’s their job to discover whose 
ends these serve” (Deleuze 1990: 247).
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There is yet no sign indicating that the situation has changed much over 
the last twenty years – or that it has got better. What about the grandchildren 
of May 68? For them as for the generation of their parents, it would be 
impossible to say that the possibilities have closed up because these are 
still laboring them, although they still haven’t found any institutional em-
bodiment or any particular place to develop in collective modes of existence. 
On the other hand, the field of possibilities has become smaller: If one may 
sometimes feel that ‘there is no alternative’, it is perhaps because the fight 
seems to be one-sided, even more unfair today than it was yesterday. Indeed, 
how can one fight against the economic forces of neoliberalism and stock-
market speculation, how can one fight against the political powers of com-
munication and populism, against the police and military powers of the 
security order, how can one fight against the religious powers of funda-
mentalism or against the media powers of an arrogant conformism? Given 
these conditions, how can we resist? Yet, has philosophical thinking ever 
been placed in a different situation than this one here? In 1990 Deleuze 
stated that philosophy cannot wage war against these forms of power, but 
that it nonetheless engages in negotiations with them, and more than that 
it engages in a guerrilla warfare against them.
But what could this paradoxical option really mean? Engaging in negotiations 
but without exchanging, without communicating? It is clear that the op-
position between negotiating and communicating first betrays some sort 
of suspicion and distrust, not only of the circumstances in which we are 
condemned to express ourselves (the submission of mass-media to the 
authority of audience rating) but, above all a distrust of communication as 
such, a distrust of the demand and command to express ourselves.
“We sometimes go on as though people can’t express themselves. In fact 
they’re always expressing themselves. The sorriest couples are those where 
the woman can’t be preoccupied or tired without the man saying ‘What’s 
wrong? Say something…’, or the man, without the woman saying…, and 
so on. Radio and television have spread this spirit everywhere, and we’re 
riddled with pointless talk, insane quantities of words and images. Stupid-
ity’s never blind or mute. So it’s not a problem of getting people to express 
themselves but of providing little gaps of solitude and silence in which 
they might eventually find something to say. Repressive forces don’t stop 
people expressing themselves but rather force them to express themselves. 
What a relief to have nothing to say, the right to say nothing, because 
only then is there a chance of framing the rare, and ever rarer, thing that 
might be worth saying. What we’re plagued by these days isn’t any block-
ing of communication, but pointless statements” (Deleuze 1990: 176–177).
In 1990 in an interview with Toni Negri, Deleuze will drive this point home: 
“Maybe speech and communication have been corrupted. They’re thoroughly 
permeated by money – and not by accident but by their very nature. We’ve 
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got to hijack speech. Creating has always been something different from com-
municating. The key thing may be to create vacuoles of non communication, 
circuit breakers, so we can elude control” (Deleuze 1990: 238).
We have no reason to believe that these are threats only to television and 
common speech, and that they do not apply to the expression of critical 
thinking. Contrary to what we can sometimes hear, there may not be such 
an undersupply of critical thinkers, neither an insufficient supply of journals 
to help their idea circulate, nor a lack in public space where these ideas 
could be welcome. Probably, what is missing most is time to produce and 
receive critical thinking, we need this time-out that blends with the event 
itself and which the supremacy of instant communication will suppress. 
The problem is not, as some would have it, that the world is getting up in 
speed but that this time-out is shrinking and dying out. This is not about 
singing the praises of slowness, as speed and slowness are more comple-
mentary than in an adversarial situation. This is about the necessity of a 
time-out which is a common feature of both head-spinning speeds and the 
greatest slowness.
“I don’t think the media have much capacity or inclination to grasp an 
event. In the first place, they often show a beginning or end, whereas 
even a short or instantaneous event is something going on. And then, 
they want something spectacular, whereas events always involve periods 
when nothing happens. It’s not even a matter of there being such periods 
before and after some event, they’re part of the event itself: you can’t, for 
example, extract the instant of some terribly brutal accident from the vast 
empty time in which you see it coming, staring at what hasn’t yet hap-
pened, waiting ages for it to happen. The most ordinary event casts us as 
visionaries, whereas the media turn us into mere passive onlookers, or 
worse still, voyeurs” (Deleuze 1990: 217–218).
Bourdieu was the living proof of a double impossibility that affects the 
expression of criticism: the impossibility for the philosopher to remain in 
his academic and scholarly ivory tower, the impossibility for him to criticize 
the media inside the media, to condemn television on television2. So what 
can we do, then? How, on the one hand, can we set up a blank space in 
which something could happen, in which something could take place and 
out of which a thought that deserves to be uttered may bloom, without this 
same blank space being mistaken for some ivory tower? And, on the other 
hand, how can we formulate this idea, how can we hold and maintain this 
resistance speech against the social powers, how can we do it without falling 
into that media pulp, into that generalized comparability of personal opin-
ions? In short, how can we make criticism and silence run through each 
other? This debate on the expression of critical thinking cannot part from 
2  See Bourdieu 2002. On television, see Bourdieu 2002: 409–416.
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another debate about its content. Where, today, does that field of possi-
bilities lie? How can we wrest an idea from snowballing clichés, an idea 
that would not bear that look of déjà-vu?
As for the mode of expression of criticism, it would be a mistake to under-
estimate the political scope of the analysis Deleuze made of mannerism in 
the 1980s, from A Thousand Plateaus in 1980 to “Bartleby; or The Formula” 
in 1988 to The Fold and the “Letter to Serge Daney” in 1986. It is true that 
mannerism is quite a complex category. First, in the history of art it is a 
controversial aesthetic category (between the Renaissance and the Baroque) 
but it is also a clinical category used to refer to some positions that are 
typical of schizophrenics (a high-flown distancing of the world and others). 
But as suggested by Deleuze’s analyses, this category generally applies to a 
series of reactions to a social situation that tends to be unbearable to live 
in. During the sixteenth century these were the glaring contradiction of 
Renaissance Europe: a yearning for harmony and balance reaching for the 
universal on the one hand, and on the other hand violent wars, the violence 
of religious wars and peasant wars, the massacres that accompanied the 
invasion of Central Europe by the Turks, the development of the colonies in 
America. In the second half of the twentieth century, the consequences of 
an all set of factors are now breaking about “the idea of one single misery, 
internal and external, in the world and in consciousness” (Deleuze 1983: 
282): the Second World War and its aftermaths, the swaying of the American 
Dream, the awareness of ethnic and sexual minorities, the development of 
advanced capitalism, the building up of audio-visual clichés both in the 
real world and our mind, etc. – a whole open series of factors which do not 
relate to a global situation or to one that could apply to the whole world 
but factors which relate to a fragmented world, to a dispersive reality. In 
any case, the ‘manners’ of the artist as that of the schizophrenic entail a 
tactic of the balk, some displayed unwillingness, a split personality to be 
regarded as a response to the impossibility to join in the world as to free 
oneself from it. This is a response that more thoroughly refers to a tactic 
aimed at neutralizing the world and the identities it is purporting to allocate 
us all. A humorous reaction and a very critical one that creates a distance 
which goal is to temporarily suspend the difference between resistance and 
escape, between engagement and disengagement3. Or, as Bartleby would 
have it: “I would prefer not to…”4. There is no reason to believe that man-
nerism cannot apply to philosophy or to the critical stance in general. 
Rather the contrary, in a situation where no one believes in the world that 
3  See Sibertin-Blanc 2016: chap. 13.
4  “At each occurrence, there is a stupor surrounding Bartleby, as if one had heard 
the Unspeakable or the Unstoppable. And there is Bartleby’s silence, as if he had said 
everything and exhausted the language at the same time” (Deleuze 1993: 91).
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looks like a bad film and a film we feel does not apply to us, where the con-
nections between the citizen and the world have been severed, where the 
common comforts have become worthless, mannerism implies this operation 
through which this relation proves to be mainly a problematic one, one 
which possibility is not given and one that a language that is confronted to 
the silence within will eventually reap and collect.
What are today’s examples of those problematic relations? Or, similarly: 
Where does the field of the im-possibilities lie? In a recent publication “The 
German Dream: Neoliberalism and Fortress of Europe” Sociologist Eric 
Fassin and Journalist Aurélie Windels asked “What is the nature of the link 
between the reign of neoliberalism and political xenophobia in Europe?” 
(Fassin and Windels 2016). They showed how Germany, by taking advantage 
of the economic and the migrant crisis that are swaying Europe today, have 
taken over what was the main idea of the American dream – namely its 
imperialist logic: the union of an expansionist liberal economic policy and 
a migratory policy bent on hospitality for the wretched of the earth, so that 
in the end Germany have made its power desirable. Following a double 
axis East-West and North-South, the possibilities are yet somewhere else: 
moving the war and sovereignty issue away by supporting a policy of 
power-lessness (im-puissance) such as Etienne Balibar had put forward in 
2003 in his book entitled Europe, America, War; to make this powerlessness 
attractive by thwarting the division between the wretched of the earth from 
the Middle-East and Africa on the one hand and, on the other hand those 
who pretend it is their responsibility to look after other people’s lands, by 
establishing a symmetrical effect between those who are claiming their 
‘right’ to migrate and those who are claiming their ‘right’ to welcome them 
or block them out; shifting both these rights to the common ecological 
principle which determine them, the im-possibility to inhabit and share a 
world that was not created for us.
Translated in English by Frédéric Dupont
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Igor Krtolica
Može li se nešto dogoditi?
Rezime
Naj pre po la zim od tek sta ko ji su De lez i Ga ta ri na pi sa li 1984. go di ne o po sle di ca ma 
maj skih do ga đa ja 1968. u Fran cu skoj (“Maj ‘68 se ni je do go dio”), da bih u svom 
pri lo gu po ku šao da ana li zi ram na ko ji na čin se nji ho va di jag no za – iz ve de na sre di-
nom osam de se tih u vre me raz vo ja sa da uobi ča je nog neo li be ra li zma u Ame ri ci i 
Evro pi – mo že pri me ni ti na na šu tre nut nu po li tič ku si tu a ci ju. Dru go, ta ana li za 
uka zu je da su mo žda upra vo da nas vi še ne go ikad ugro že ni uslo vi dru štve ne kri-
ti ke i dru štve nog an ga žma na s raz vo jem no vih obra za ca dru štve ne pri nu de sa dr-
ža ne u evo lu ci ji ko mu ni ka ci ja (po seb no te le vi zi je). Tre će, sto ga se pi tam, pod 
ko jim uslo vi ma su dru štve na kri ti ka i an ga žman da nas uop šte mo gu ći?
Ključ ne re či: an ga žman, De lez, Ga ta ri, Maj ’68, do ga đaj, kri ti ka, te le vi zi ja, ko mu-
ni ka ci ja
